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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

UTAH COUNTY, a body
corporate and politic,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
CASE NO.
VS

17039

JUDY BAXTER, SQUAW PEAK,
INC., TOM STUBBS, FRANK
HORTON and DIANA HORTON,
Defendant-Appellants

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, JUDY BAXTER

CORRECTED STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondents have mischaracterized the nature of the case
in their brief.

The court granted an injunction in favor of

respondent, against Judy Baxter, hereinafter referred to as
appellant,

wherein appellant was enjoined from further main-

taining an eating, beer selling, commercial establishment on
the property in question.

(T.R. 71,72)

RESTATED DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Respondent did not fully state the disposition in the
lower court, since they omitted the fact that the injunction
issued by said court, further enjoined appellant from selling

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

beer out of the single-family dwelling, pursuant to her beer
license and enjoined her from using the single-family dwelling for any commercial purpose.
CORRECTED RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent has further mischaracterized the relief appellant is seeking from the above-entitled court.

Respondent

would have this court believe that the relief she is seeking
would allow her to only use the property in question for a
commercial establishment.

That is only half true, since

appellant is seeking relief for every license and purpose the
injunction has prohibited her from using, which relief would
also include the use of a beer license on said property, since
prior to this particular action, she did enjoy the benefit of
a beer license in addition to a commercial license on the
above-referred to property.
CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS
As was stated in appellant's brief, the property in
question was never in a commercial zone, yet since 1935 a
commercial enterprise has been located on the property.

Sub-

sequent to the recently enacted zoning laws, the County Commis-

sion allowed appellant's predecessor, as well as appellant, to
continue the nonconforming use in said zone, which use included
the commercial business, prior to its destruction by fire, as
well as the single-family residence, located on said property,
which was built solely as a caretaker home for the commercial
establishment.

Appellant takes issue with the characterization
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by respondent that that particular watershed areJ, at the
side of that particular property now is environmentally
fragile, with its preservation to be of critical importance
to respondent.

The fact that a commercial establishment,

with its attendant license to sell beer on that property,
which has existed since 1935, is really an anomily to the
characterization of an environmentally fragile and critical
preservation objective of respondent.
Further, the original commercial establishment was destroyed by fire in 1978, not 1977, as is explained in·appellant's brief.
Respondent's statement of the facts would imply that apellant completely misrepresented the use to which she was applying, regarding the single-family residence.

If, the evidence

shows that at the time the building permit was filled out by
appellant, both Mrs. Snell and Mr. Parker, employees and agents
of respondent, knew that the use would be commercial, which
would include the use of a beer license, rather than a singlefamily residence.

(T.R. 45,51,55,57)

Further, respondent implies that appellant submitted a
site plan prepared solely on her own initiative.

It, Mro

Parker, an employee of respondent, told defendant to draft a
site plan.
Even though defendant identified the rooms within the
single-family dwelling as those which could be identified to
a single-family residence, defendant did tell Mr. Parker that
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walls were being knocked out with large closet areas which
would be used as coolers, in order that appellant would be
able to sell beer out of the property in question.

(T.R. 45)

Respondents make an issue of the fact that after cornpletion of improvements to the home appellant made application for a business license for said structure.

In reality,

appellant applied for a building permit to remodel the caretaker home on November 15, 1978 and Mr. Parker filled out the
building permit while appellant apprised him of the fact that
she was intending to sell beer from the caretaker home, once
it was remodeled into a lounge.

The fact to bear in mind is

that Mrs. Snell, told appellant that in order to keep t11e nonconforming use viable, a structural remodel or replacement
had to be made within 12 months of the fire, which 12-month
period would expire on or about January 17, 1979.

Therefore,

appellant still had a corrunercial and beer license on the
premises in question.
Respondent states that appellant knew that her commercial use of the home was, at best, temporary.

Such is not

the case, since respondent interrupted her before she was
able to complete her answer.

(T.R. 50)

ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANT DOES HAVE STANDING IN
EQUITY TO PRAY FOR ESTOPPEL
Respondent cites several cases to the effect that "He
who comes into equity must come with clean hands."

-4-

Further,
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"He who has done inequity shall not have equity.

The doc-

trine of unclean hands cuts both ways, especially in this
case against respondents.

Respondents came to the trial

court seeking equity, yet they are the ones who induced
appellant to rely to her detriment, which caused her to suffer great financial injury; and respondents were also guilty
of laches; therefore, they are the ones who came with the
unclean hands; thus allowing respondent to enjoy the fruits
of their transgressions.
Respondent argues that appellant would have this court
estop the county from exercising its police powers.

Yet,

since the state or an entity therein is really a creation of
the people whom the entity governs, the entity has no right
to tranunel its citizens rights, in the name of the entity's
police powers.

Such would be a denial of due process, as is

set forth in the Constitution of the United States, wherein
the due process clause specifically states
shall".

11

that no state

In fact, the state should be more scrupulous in its

dealings with its citizens than one citizen should with
another.
Respondent would have this Honorable Court believe that
appellant falsified her application to respondent, in order
to obtain a building permit.

However, the evidence deduced

at the trial simply showed that that was not the case.

Apel-

lant went to Ron Parker, an employee of the county, employed
in the building inspection and zoning office (T.R. 33,34) on
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November 15, 1978 and applied for a building permit to remodel the caretaker home.

Mr. Parker filled out the build-

ing permit and appellant apprised him of the fact that she
was going to sell beer from the caretaker home, remodeled
into a lounge.

(T.R. 45)

By Iva Snell's own admission,

she and Mr. Parker both knew at the time of the application, or shortly thereafter that the purpose for the remodeling was a cormnercial establishment in which beer
would be sold.

(T.R. 45,51,55 and 57)

Further, Ms. Snell

said that she may have told appellant that she could have
a commercial business in that remodeled home.

(T.R. 55)

In addition, Mr. Parker told appellant to submit to him a
site plan, wherein she expressed to him that the large
closets would be in reality cooler.

In light of the above,

it is ludicrous to assume that appellant misled the county
in any way, since Ms. Snell and Mr. Parker were fully cognizant of the purpose for which the remodeling was done, and
that Ms. Snell may have told appellant that she could have a
commercial business in that remodeled home.
On page 8 of respondents' brief, they make the statement
that "certainly the weight of evidence supported the court's
finding:

'That the defendant, Judy Baxter, had no agreement

with plaintiff allowing commercial use of the single-family
dwelling."'

Respondent does not cite any page in the trial

record as to that finding.

In fact, appellant is at a loss

as to that specific finding, since they have read and re-
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read the trial record, hoping to find said finding.

If there

is no such finding, could it be that respondent is intentionally trying to mislead this court?
Even though appellant's building permit application
had all of the markings of a single-family residence, Mr.
Parker assisted her in filling out the building permit
application and as was before stated he and Ms. Snell were
fully cognizant of the commercial purpose for which appellant
was remodeling the home.

In fact,

the fact that respondents,

through Ms. Snell and Mr. Parker knew the actual purpose, and
that knowing said purpose they allowed her to proceed in the
manner in which she did, then most certainly the estoppel
argument can best be applied against respondents, since they
caused appellant to rely to her detriment, knowing full well
that because of their representations or failure to act induced her to so detrimentally rely.
II
RESPONDENT CAN BE ESTOPPED FROM
-SEEKING A PERMANENT INJUNCTION,
EVEN THOUGH SAID INJUNCTION IS
BASED ON A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS
POLICE POWER
Respondents contend that appellant's contention and
reasoning is faulty where a party seeking an injunction must
show a clear legal or equitable right and a well-grounded
fear of immediate invasion of that right.

In support of their

contention that appellant's reasoning is faulty,

they state

that the doctrine of estoppel is not generally applicable
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against a government body.

Further, they state "only under

exceptional circumstances have a few jurisdictions allowed
estoppel to be applied."

For this sweeping declaration,

respondents cite one case, which at best is a Mississippi
case, bearing the date of 1977.

If the doctrine of estoppel

is not generally applicable against a governmental body except only under "exceptional circumstances" and why did not
respondent quote a Utah case for that same principle, since
respondents would have this court believe that that is the
majority ;rule.

Then in support of such an erroneous con-

clusion, respondent cites the case of Salt Lake County v.
Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136,138.

The quote by respondent from

the Kartchner, supra, is really dicta, and is not part of
the ruling.

Quoting from another portion of that same case,

the court stated:
"When a municipal corporation seeks vindication of public rights by injunction, in
a court of equity, it is on the same footing as any private person or corporation
. . . the court will consider the equities
between the parties and under some circumstances deny equitable relief, because a
grave injury will be suffered by defendant
because of a mandatory injunction, with
little or no benefit to complainant."
At page 140 of 552 P.2d, the court stated further:
"A mandatory injunction will never be granted where it might
operate inequitably or oppressively.
It would appear that the case cited by respondents of
State v. St. Charles City Board of Adjustment, 553 S.W.2d
729, is not the law in the State of Utah, since the Kartchner,
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supra case does not rule that the doctrine of estoppel is
to be applied "only in exceptional circumstances and with
great caution."
On page 11 of respondents' brief, they state "it is
unreasonable to think that a municipality must weigh and
consider the 'conveniences' before exercising legitimate
police powers in enforcing its zoning laws.
not a

That theory is

'well established and fundamental rule of law' in the

field of zoning enforcement."

However, the court in

Kartchner, supra, does that vary weighing of the conveniences even when it is dealing with a municipality or a
governmental entity?

The above cite states that the court

will consider the equities between the parties and in
effect will balance the fact of a great injury to be
suffered by defendant and the benefit to the complainant.
Further, when the above court stated that "a mandatory injunction will never be granted where it might operate inequitably or oppressively" in order for the court to reach
that conclusion it has to balance and consider the conveniences as well as the detriments involved.
The case of Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control
Commission, 602 P.2d 689,690,694,695 (Utah 1979), involved
a governmental entity and the invocation of the doctrine of
equitable e·stoppel.

That particular case is cited in

appellant's original brief.

In the interest of brevity,

only one portion of that case will be cited herein:
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"The conduct of government should always be
scrupulously just in dealing with its citizens; and where a public official, acting
within his authority and with knowledge of
the pertinent facts, has made a commitment
and the party to whom it was made has acted
to his detriment in reliance on that commitment, the official should not be permitted
to revoke that commitment."
Certainly, that is the law of the State of Utah,
rather than the Mississippi case, to whom respondent
has referred.

Further, as was before stated, appellant

can invoke the doctrine of estoppel, especially since by
the respondent's agents own admissions, appellant did not
act fraudulently or in bad faith.
By Ms. Snell's own admissions, she did not act in a
manner which exceeded her powers, while dealing with
appellant.

In fact, there was never any evidence deduced

at the trial to show that Ms. Snell was not authorized to
grant to appellant the right to have a commercial business
license and a beer license in the remodeled single-family
dwelling.
Appellant wishes to call the court's attention to page
25 of the trial record, wherein Ms. Snell was directly
examined by the attorney for respondents, Mr. Davis.

In

response to Mr. Davis' question, Ms. Snell said that she

is the head of the department for building inspection and
zoning enforcement and building regulation for Utah County.
When asked what her main duties were in connection with that
employment, she stated "to oversee the issuance of building
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permits, make sure that the buildings are inspected by the
inspectors during construction, the issuance of business
licenses, and the doing that we also check them out to make
sure everything is okay before they are issued; make sure
that permits that are issued comply with the zoning ordinance."

Then, Ms. Snell went on to state that she had personal

knowledge regarding the building permits issued to the property
in question, and that a permit was also given to appellant to
remodel the existing family home on the property.

Since these

facts are undisputed, and by the very nature of Ms. Snell's
own admissions that she is the head of that department and is
to oversee the issuance of licenses and building permits, then
her acts regarding appellant would show that she did not exceed her powers in the issuance of such a building permit or
engaging in acts which caused appellant to rely to her detriment thereon.

Therefore, the rule in the Celebrity case,

would be applicable to the facts set forth in this particular
case.
Further, nowhere in the Celebrity case, is there any
statement that estoppel is inapplicable, except under exceptional circumstances.

Since that case is a 1979 case, it is

reasonable to assume that Celebrity, supra, is the latest pronouncement by this court regarding the doctrine of estoppel
when dealing with a governmental entity.

It is obvious that

by making the statement that respondent has on page 11 of his
brief, that respondent is not at all familiar with Utah law
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regarding the doctrine of estoppel.
The following are cases which hold that when dealing
with a governmental entity, such as a municipal corporation, the doctrine of estoppel is applicable and does not
have to be applied only in exceptional circumstances.
In City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476
P.2d 423, 448

(1970), the court stated:

"The government may

be bound by an equitable estoppel in the same manner as a
private party when the elements requisite to such an estoppel
against a private party are present and, in the considered
view of a court of equity, the injustice which would result
from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of sufficient dimension to justify any affect upon public interest or policy
which would result from the raising of an estoppel."
In State v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725,737 (Haw. 1977), the
court stated "this court has stated that the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is fully applicable against the government
if it is necessary to invoke it to prevent manifest injustice."
In Glover v. Adult and Family Services Division of the
Department of Human Resources, 46 Or.App. 829, 613 P.2d 495,499
(1980), the court stated that "the theory of equitable estoppel
is applicable against government agencies in this state."

In

accord with the above-cited rules, are the following cases:
Gray v. Regional Transportation Department, 602 P.2d 879,880
(Colo. 1979); Jones v. Kristensen, 563 P.2d 959

(Colo.App.

1977); Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal.Rptr. 661,
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431 P.2d 245 (1967); Finch v. Matthews, 443 P.2d 833 (Wash.
1968); and Fitzgerald v. Neves, Inc., 15 Wash.App. 421, 550
P.2d 52 (1976).
In addition to the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, governmental entities should be treated
minimally in the same way as any individual is treated.

In

support of that proposition is the Utah Constitutional
provision that all laws are to be uniformly applied.
III
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
OUGHT TO BE DISTURBED IF THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES CONTRARY TO HIS DECISION, OR HE HAS
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION, OR HAS
MISAPPLIED PRINCIPLES OF LAW
In respondents' amended complaint, they stated that
"defendant's continued failure and refusal to cease and desist from such violation will result in irreparable harm to
Utah County."

Yet, because respondent was unable to bring

that evidence in over appellant's objections, they are taking
the ludicrous position that appellant should now be denied
from claiming that respondent failed to establish immediate
and irreparable harm to themselves.

Since respondent has

pled irreparable harm, they have the burden to prove irreparable harm during the trial and if they fail to do so, they
have not proven all of the elements necessary to obtain a
permanent injunction against appellant.

Further, there is

no evidence whatsoever that the health officer would have been
able to testify to any irreparable harm.
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In furtherance of respondents' ludicrous position, they
are asking this court to reasonably infer that health and
safety deficiencies will affect Utah County residents.

How

can they do this when there was no evidence deduced which
would show that any Utah County residents were affected in
any manner by any health and safety deficiencies, especially
where appellant was given the opportunity to correct said
deficiencies if there were any.

If appellant is given the

opportunity to correct said deficiencies how can respondent
suffer irreparable injury and harm.
Appellant can object to any testimony for any grounds
which she feels are necessary and if upheld, respondent cannot
now claim that appellant is at fault for respondent's failure
to meet its own burden of proof.
It is obvious from appellant's initial brief that the
court has clearly misapplied principles of law when it granted
an injunction even where respondent failed to show any detriment to the county during their case in chief.

Directing the

court's attention to pages 53 and 54 of the trial record,
when such fact was brought to the attention of the trial court,
the judge queried, "Do they have to?", to which counsel for
appellant replied, "Well they have pled it."

The court then

replied "As a matter of fact I've precluded it."

In none of

the cases cited by appellant, including the Utah cases cited
in appellant's brief, is there any principle of law to the
effect that an injunction can be granted in absence of a showing of irreparable injury and harm.

Such is not the law and
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the trial judge has misapplied the principles of law; therefore, he has committed reversible error.
cas~s

(Please ref er to the

cited in appellant's brief regarding that particular

issue.)
IV
THE DOCTRINE OF LACHES IS NOT BARRED
Respondent, by making the statement that "Utah County
was working with Ms. Baxter's counsel from May, 1979,
attempting to resolve the matter," thus making an excuse for
their delay in this matter, they are bringing up evidence
which is not contained within the trial record and was not
made an issue in the trial.

In fact, their argument has no

merit, since i t is not part of the evidence contained within
the trial record.
Further, since appellant argued facts which would show
that the defense of laches was asserted, respondents cannot
now bring to the court's attention the failure of appellant,
if any, to assert the defense of laches, when respondents did
not object to such testimony at the trial level.

Furthermore,

in Rule 8{e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, it states
"each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and
direct.

No technical forms of pleadings or motions are

required."

Further, in Rule 8(f) it states "all pleadings

shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."

In

other words, pleadings are to be liberal and broad and even
though not specifically stated, the factual allegations may
give rise to the defense of laches.

-15-

Certainly,

nowhere in the
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trial record did respondent object to any testimony which related to the defense of laches and cannot do so now.
Further, since respondent is now stating that appellant
was in clear violation of the zoning ordinances at the time
she made application for the building permit and the other
licenses involved herein, why did respondent have to wait so
long to make that determination, if the violation was so clear.
Further, since respondent has stated that appellant misrepresented certain facts, of which respondent was aware, why
didn't they immediately act to correct the violations, rather
than induce appellant either by their action or inaction to
rely thereon and thus suffer injury to herself.
Respondent cites the case of Lockard v. Los Angeles, for
the proposition that appellant has no vested right to violate
a zoning ordinance through any continuing violation.

That case

can be distinguished on the fact that a nonconforming use was
not at issue there but an outright violation of a zoning ordinance.

In the instant case, there was a nonconforming use

which does this in the user.
Respondent also cites the case of Rockford v. Sallee,
for the proposition that mere nonaction by a municipality does
not constitute acquiescence.

The facts in this instant case

show that there is more than mere nonaction by respondent
which does in fact invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel,
according to the Celebrity case, supra.
The doctrine of laches would apply just as much as the
doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in this particular juris-
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diction.

v
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS
CERTAIN ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT
It is curious to note why respondent in their brief did
not address point two, raised by appellant, to the effect that
"the trial court erred in finding that the transfer of the
business to the home enlarged the nonconforming use"; nor did
respondent address itself to point three raised by appellant
in its initial brief to the effect that "the court erred in
not requiring plaintiff to specifically prove irreparable injury and harm and also erred by granting an injunction without
requiring plaintiff to prove the same."

It is now contended

by appellant that point two and point three, raised by appellant,
are not controverted and therefore should be admitted by
respondent.

As a result, the decision reached below should be

reversed and appellant should be granted her commercial license
as well as her license to sell beer in the remodeled structure,
located on the property in question.
CONCLUSION
The appellant has not gone far afield in her arguments.
In fact, appellant has zeroed in on the issues to be adjudicatedo
It is respondent who has gone far afield in his arguments and
has not specifically addressed the issues which have been raised
as a result of this appeal.

Respondent erroneously states "it

was not meant to be a review of denial of Ms. Baxter's beer
license.

Nothing in the pleadings refers to a beer license."
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That statement is a total and complete misrepresentation of
the issues raised by respondent's amended pleadings, which
seeks to obtain a total injunction against appellant, prohibiting her from operating a commercial establishment, which
sells beer therein.

In fact, the court on page 71 of the

trial record stated "I don't think that the nonconforming
commercial use in the eating, beer-selling commercial establishment, which still exists, can be expanded to the singlefamily dwelling.

The temporary use of the home for the sell-

ing of beer during a period of reconstruction of the other
facility, the eating facility and what was prior to the fire
also engaged in the selling of beer, does not lawfully enlarge
the use of that single-family dwelling.

I further believe,

Mr. Biljanic, that the evidence does not support an estoppel
by the county on the part of the county or that any of the
evidence really constitutes a valid agreement to issue a
license for the selling of beer in the single-family dwelling,
or a license for the use of the single-family dwelling for any
commercial purpose."

That statement by the court completely

shows that the two issues adjudicated in the hearing below were
the issues of the license for the selling of beer and the
license for the use of the single-family dwelling for any
commercial purpose.

For respondent to now state that the

granting or denial of a beer license is within the exclusive
domain of the Board of County Commissioners and that said
board has never been joined as a party to this action, is
totally ludicrous and inane.

Since the court's ruling went
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to the beer license and the conunercial license and respondent's
plc1dings also address themselves to those two licenses, then
those two licenses are directly affected by the injunction
granted in the court below.

The relief for which appellant is

requesting, is that the injunction be declared null and void
and contrary to law, which would necessarily put her into the
position of having a beer license as well as a commercial
license on the property in question.

The court below took away

appellant's beer license and commercial license; therefore, if
this court reverses that particular decision, then necessarily
appellant would again regain her beer license and. her commercial license.
At this point, i t is a statement couched in pomposity that
respondents can state that defendant's counsel has confused the
facts considerably.

Furthermore, respondent brings up issues

which were not even part of the trial record, nor were entered
into evidence, in order to cajole this court into ruling in
their favor.
level.

Such arguments have no place at the appellant

Furthermore, it is obvious that respondent's so-called

advantage of having participated at the trial, has not helped
them in meeting their own burdens of proof nor in stating the
facts and evidence accurately to this Honorable Court.

The

next two paragraphs of respondent's conclusion are totally unsupported by law and the facts in this case and have been
dealt with in the original brief of appellant.
Finally, respondent enumerates certain alleged facts

-19Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which appellant allegedly testifed to or admitted at trial,
to which appellant will show the court are totally erroneous,
to wit:

There is no testimony to the effect that appellant

endorsed the building permit claiming the intended use to be
residential; in fact, respondent's own witnesses stated that
they were totally cognizant of the fact that appellant desired
to have a commercial use in the said home as well as a beer
license; in fact, Ms. Snell stated that she may have told
appellant that she could have a commercial use in that singlef amily dwelling.
Referring to paragraph 2 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant did file a site plan with the rooms identified

as residential rooms, however said site plan was filed on Mr.
Parker's request, and contemporaneous to that filing of said
plan, appellant informed Mr. Parker of her true intentions of
using the building as a commercial beer-selling establishment.
Referring to paragraph 3 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

The fact that appellant spent between $12,000 and

$15,000 goes more in appellant's favor, since her reliance
damages are much greater with those two figures.
Referring to paragraph 4 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant did in fact use the home for a commercial,

business; but such intent was clearly conveyed to respondent.
Referring to paragraph 5 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant never did testify that she did not have a

business license to conduct a business in that home; rather,
she testified that there was no need for her to have a business
-20Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

license in said home, since she already did have ~ business
license, in the form of a nonconforming use on the property
in question.
Referring to paragraph 6 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant never did state that she intended the commer-

cial use of her home to be temporary, since she was interrupted
by respondent's attorney's questioning.
Referring to paragraph 7 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant did intend to transfer business to the new

structure, or in any unforeseen events.
Referring to paragraph 8 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

Appellant did experience problems with her partners and

was unable to transfer, but those two issues are in opposite to
the instant case.
Referring to paragraph 9 in the conclusion of respondent's
brief:

The statement by respondent that the problems "were

not caused by any misleading on the part of Utah County or its
officers is not correct and has been taken out of context.

That

particular statement just refers to the issue of having two
commercial uses on the property and does not refer to the fact
that the county, through its officers and agents, did mislead
and misrepresent certain facts to appellant, upon which appellant relied to her detriment.

There is plenty of evidence and

testimony given by appellant, showing that the county and its
employees definitely did mislead her.

Furthermore, respondent

on page 10 of the respondent's brief, is attempting to mislead
the court here by stating that the court, "supported by the
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evidence at trial, found no misleading by respondent."
There was never any finding made to that effect by the
trial court.

Respondent should not attempt to mislead this

court by quoting passages out of context, especially in view
of overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Furthermore, at

the end of respondent's conclusion, respondent again brings
up issues which were not litigated, which are totally and
completely unsupported by the trial record, in fact, are not
even mentioned in the trial record.
Therefore, appellant again prays that the decision
rendered below be reversed by this court, so that the injunction gran.ted be of no force or effect, thus allowing appellant
to again sell beer and operate a commercial establishment in
the single-family dwelling, now remodeled into a lounge.
Respectfully submitted this
'{ day of May, 1981.
HANSEN & HANSEN
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
Judy Baxter
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